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Abstract: This paper questions the role of emotions in judicial persuasion: first, I will provide a brief overview of
affective states, focusing on the structure of s.c. epistemic feelings; then, I will present some experiments which are
going to be developed in a current research-project in a local court in Italy, to understand the interpersonal effects of
epistemic feelings on judicial persuasion; finally, I will draw conclusive reflections on the relationship between forensic rhetoric and emotion.
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1. Introduction
Despite a long-standing interest on emotions and several researches on emotional reactions and
attitude formation, especially through psychological and cognitive exploration, emotions in
courtrooms have received very limited attention. We know that people use their emotions to influence other people's attitudes but we tend to refer to the judge as a superman, capable of remaining impervious to emotional attacks and to decide on the basis of a rational logical path. The
decision is considered to be an exercise in pure rationality and emotions are generally considered
as irrational or disturbing factors of cognitive processing. The use of pathos is interpreted as an
irrational tool opposed to rational proof, a diversionary strategy, and alternative to reasoning. In
judicial reasons, the pathetic argument is excluded or evaded: therefore, deliberately, it is unclear
whether emotional expressions indeed influence attitude formation and/or change and, if so, under which circumstances such influence occurs.
Here, we investigate the possibility that judges, as individuals, use emotions as information upon which to base their attitudes and their final decision.
We argue that at the basis of the split between emotions and judgment there is a certain
concept of rhetoric and, therefore, of persuasion.
We believe that the devaluation of the decisive role of emotions in the judicial decisionmaking process is conditioned by the negative meaning with which we still speak of rhetoric today. A centuries-old tradition has accustomed us to think of rhetorical discourse as a partisan,
subjective, irrational and emotional discourse. Although the process of re-evaluation of this discipline has been going on for more than half a century, centuries of discredit and mistrust have
marked an evident trace in the use of rhetoric as manipulation (Raimondi, 2002).
The rebirth and recovery of this discipline is a complex and non-linear phenomenon:
rhetoric has been taken up in many argumentative fields, from literature to communication, from
economics to social psychology, up to the law. This operation took on different meanings.
This study enhances the recovery of a rhetorical way in the legal field: this way will reject the
dualism between emotions and judgment and consider judicial discourse as essentially emotional
and pathetic.
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Before developing this idea, it is important to consider some definitional issues. The paper will
therefore be divided into three parts:
a) First, we will give a general definition of emotion, with the intention of showing an
overview of all forms of emotional reactions. Among the affective states we will focus in
particular on the so-called epistemic feelings, as they play a leading role in reasoning and
judgment.
b) The objective of this research is to investigate whether, and if so, under which conditions,
judges use epistemic feelings as information and when forming their attitudes. At this
stage we will present some experiments that will be developed in a territorial court in
Italy (Court of Appeal of Trento) to a sample of judges. Experiments investigate how
epistemic feelings can shape the judicial attitudes about an object.
c) Finally, the aim of the third part is to highlight the relationship between emotions and
judgment and to lead empirical experiments into a rhetorical analysis of emotions.
2. Emotions: an overview of current research and theories
Definitions of emotion vary widely: combining elements of several influential accounts, there is
considerable consensus on a number of key aspects1. Emotions can be defined as comparatively
short-lived, differentiated, and intense responses to events that are appraised as relevant to a particular concern or goal (Lazarus, 1991), which are directed toward a specific stimulus (e.g., a
person, an object, a situation) and are characterized by distinct subjective experiences, expressions and action tendencies.
Emotion, from a conceptual point of view, means all forms of affective reaction to specific stimuli, experienced as positive or negative. It is an affective episode, which arises suddenly,
spontaneously and which has a short duration. For instance, happiness arises when one is making
good progress, sadness arises when one faces a loss and anger arises when one's goals are frustrated.
Emotions arise from an individual's appraisal of the situation (Lazarus, 1991): as a situation can be positive or negative in many ways, appraisal is multidimensional and depends on aspects related to one's identity. According to some theories (Haidt, 2001), emotions are reactions
determined by our history and culture. According to others (Prinz, 2004), there are moral emotions, preceding and determining moral decisions.
These qualities differentiate emotions from moods, which are more diffuse, longer lasting
feeling states without a clear cause or object. In contrast to emotions or feelings, moods are less
specific, less intense and less likely to be provoked by a particular stimulus or event. People experience positive or negative: there have been many studies done on the effect of the moods on
the cognitive mind (Martin, E. A. & Kerns, J. G., 2011).
Mood also differs from temperament or personality traits, which are even longer lasting.
Temperament is associated with personality: it is something you are born with or acquire young
and seldom change. Temperament lasts for the duration: it is a lifetime platform on which
moods and emotions occur (Schinnerer, J.L. 2007). Temperaments are often vague, diffuse
emotions, which may be contrasted with the more distinct mood and very specific emotions.
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For an overview on the affective states and their diffence, see P. Goldie (2000, Ch. 6) and J. Prinz (2004, Ch. 8).
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Emotions involve feelings. According to Peter Goldie (Goldie, 2008), emotions involve two
kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Bodily feelings are directed towards the
condition of one’s body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of
one’s body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an
event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion.
Feelings differ from full-edged emotions in two ways (de Sousa, 2009). Unlike emotions, feelings can be attributed at a subpersonal level, whereas emotions are typically attributed only to
persons. Moreover, emotions are more complex than feelings, which share four points of resemblance with emotions: involving evaluative appraisal; telling something about the subject and the
object; playing a role in the guidance of intellectual activity; having a characteristic phenomenology.
Emotional expressions convey information about the expresser's feelings (Ekman, 1993),
traits, social intentions and appraisal of the situation (Ekman, 1993).
Building on the idea that emotional expressions provide information, the s.c. EASI theory
investigates the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions (Gerben & Heerdink, 2015; van
den Berg; van Kleef). According to this model, individuals can thus acquire pieces of information from others' emotional expressions.
Among feelings, epistemic feelings are those that enter into the epistemic processes of
cognition. Epistemic feelings have attracted attention only quite recently: if it is not controversial
that emotions play a role in the process of deliberation, it is important to clarify more specifically
what this means.
A recent study indicates an exemplary classification of epistemic feelings as suggestion to
understand how they affect cognition, inquiry and meta-cognition. We will report here some indications to clear up their nuances (De Sousa, 2009, pp. 146-147). De Sousa lists four categories
of epistemic feelings:
1) Wonder or curiosity: such feeling motivates inquiry about a range of questions or topics
without assuming any clear questions.
2) Doubt: motivates inquiry but it presupposes a specific proposition or existing beliefs.
3) Certainty or rightness: it is the opposite of doubts. This feeling blocks any inquiry
because we may feel we have the answer we are looking for. Certainty about one
proposition does not preclude further inquiry into other questions. Very close to the
feeling of certainty, which focuses on propositions, we face with the distinct feeling of
trust, which regards persons. Strictly speaking, trust is not an epistemic feeling, but
because of the importance of testimony in the formation of most of our beliefs, De Sousa
argued worth including it.
4) Familiarity: it is a metacognitive feeling that induces us to believe that we know
something before we are able to retrieve what we know.
What is most remarkable about the epistemic feelings is the complexity of their mechanisms because they normally escape awareness. They lie below the level of conscious deliberation: epistemic feelings seem to serve precisely the function of providing premises elaborated at the subpersonal or intuitive level for use in explicit inferences (de Sousa, 2009, p. 152). So they determine a process that is functionally equivalent to making an inference, even though no explicit inference is made.
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Epistemic feelings play a leading role in reasoning and judgment. In our daily life, we
could find more examples of these affective states that guide our reasoning and our actions.
Suppose we believe true that the professor of philosophy of law at the Faculty is an upright person: how can we believe this information to be true? Where do we get this information?
This information is derived from specific epistemic sensations, such as the feeling of certainty.
Suppose someone claims that the coronavirus is incurable and that we will never be able to have
a vaccine: faced with this proposition, the feeling that many would have is uncertainty.
The evaluation of information is never neutral but is accompanied by sensations that tell us, for
each piece of information, if it is certain / uncertain, evident / doubtful, true / false, known / unknown, familiar/unfamiliar.
The theorists of epistemic feelings point out that when we think, we process information:
our feelings participate in the cognitive process. The information, that is the object of our thinking is, in fact, perceived as obvious, interesting, questionable, familiar, unknown, related to others, etc. Our thinking is always combined with sensations, which are not expressed in inferences
and, therefore, not evident.
The fact that we consider information as obvious / doubtful / true / false / certain / uncertain / surprising / boring / known / unknown depends on our personal epistemic feelings.
We believe that this category of feelings shows a further aspect of the role of emotions compared
to cognitions: to ensure a good understanding of what people say and of social situations, the use
of rationality and the examination of reasons and motivations exposed is insufficient. It is necessary to penetrate the reasoning and analyse the feelings that underlie people's behaviour. In the
same way, being aware of our emotional regulation allows us to fully understand our thinking
and to enjoy our emotions without falling victim to them.
Perceiving emotions is indispensable in the cognitive process: for their analysis and control.
This ability must be exercised by everyone, both in the interpersonal relationship and in
the personal rethinking.
In the legal field, it is conceivable that arguments may be perceived by the judge in a certain way depending on his own epistemic feelings, which undermine and trigger the argumentation developed by the parties.
Epistemic feelings are used in judicial cognition, as they are in everyday arguing, but it is
unknown their practical relevance.
To investigate the effects of such epistemic feelings on judicial attitudes, one direction
that we believe would be particularly interesting is the empirical research, aimed at reconstructing the decision-making process in some specific law-cases and, in particular, re-evaluating information on the basis of epistemic feelings in order to finally understand how much one's feelings may affect cognition and inquiry in judgment.
In the next section we will report on an experiment that will be developed in Trento (Italy), with the collaboration of a sample of judges operating in a territorial Court. The research
project is funded by the Faculty of Law of Trento and the Trento Bar Association. Due to the
COVID-19 health emergency, the experimental research has been interrupted and will be resumed compatibly with the safety measures. For this reason, in this paper, we will indicate one
of the tests, without being able to discuss now the expected results.
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3. Experimental studies on epistemic feelings in judgment
The objective of the present research is to investigate whether, and if so under which conditions,
judges use their own epistemic feelings as information when forming the decision. The topic of
origins and relations of the epistemic feelings is highly relevant but still under-researched.
Vogl et al. (2019) is a handful experimental study addressing several epistemic emotions to investigate their origins and effect, exploring both within-person and between-person data. This
present study will not replicate those findings. The present research question is novel and relevant for judicial reasoning: we focus on detecting the use of epistemic feelings and their impact
in the decision-making process. The experimental perspective of analysis is that of legal argumentation, as developed in the frame of forensic rhetoric studies, in Italy, by Cermeg (Research
Centre on Legal Methodology).2
The perspective is pragmatist, by taking into account how facts, values, knowledge and
errors are intertwined in the legal reasoning. Looking at the practice and the experience of judging, forensic rhetoric proposes is a model based on rhetoric to reduce the gap between judgment
as it is and judgment as it should be. According to this model, the rhetorical procedure does not
involve the loss of rationality but rather enriches the criteria in a movement that tends to include
rational, ethical and emotional factors. How should the judge decide in a reasonable way? According to this theory, the judge should take into account the speeches of the parties, analyse
them and evaluate them according to different criteria: topical adequacy, relevance, logical coherence, dialectical correctness and persuasive commitment.
The model must be integrated to deeply understand the role of emotions. We chose to focus not on emotions in general but on the four classes of epistemic feelings: while we may be
able to assess the validity of deductive arguments set out in the judgment, we may be not be able
to achieve the complete analytic understanding of the judicial process. Knowing the basic epistemic feelings means acquiring a deep knowledge about fundamental dimensions of emotion affecting cognition.
The method of research will consist in an interview: judges will be asked to review their
decisions through specific questions that will help them understand how information was processed. Through a process of reverse appraisal, the judges-observers will may infer epistemic
feeling in relation to a particular object and evaluate what feelings they may incorporate in their
attitude about the object and measure how much they affect their inquiry, cognition and metacognition.
For instance, the feelings of knowing include the judgment that one has learnt something.
That means there is an implicit, unconscious and automatic process consisting in retrieving information from memory: this provides guidance on further choices. But we don’t know anything
about the accuracy of the sensory output of this research. Such feeling provides an indication but
we don’t know if it is or not reliable because the process of retrieving information is not explicitconscious or controlled.
Based on this logic we propose to the judges, who participate in the research, to review
the decision process, detecting the epistemic feelings and evaluating their use and their effect on
reasoning.
The participating judges will be recruited on a voluntary basis from the judges of the territorial court of Trento. Both judges and public prosecutors will participate as decision-makers in
the research project. Each magistrate is asked to select at least one recent provision (order or sen2

See Manzin (2020), Puppo (2020) and Tomasi (2020).
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tence), including the motivation part. All instructions and questions will be presented through the
computer. The approach is straightforward: we will ask participants about their attitude toward
that object, the parties and the lawyers assisting the parties. Participants will be instructed to
carefully rethink about the judgment, the context, and work experience, personal relationships
with the parties and with the lawyers, memories and intuition. They would be asked some questions about it. Through the questions, we will explicit internal states, including emotional reactions and attitudes. Participants will also rate the applicability of each epistemic feeling, from 0
(not applicable) to 5 (very applicable). We will collect more data by increasing the number of
judges and the number of provisions to be re-analysed for each judge.
Questions are asked in such a way as to obtain an immediate and spontaneous response
from the judge: there is a risk that the judge, in analysing her own decision-making process, will
not be willing to recognize her own epistemic feelings as a source of information. For this reason, we will provide questions about facts and objects that are related to epistemic feelings. We
design patterns of questions aimed at understanding if the effect is more likely due to the information inherent in the epistemic feelings.
In this paper, we will present an extract of the questionnaire, dividing the questions related to the classes of feelings.
See following page of this article for Table 1 with questionnaire (p. 7).

6

Table 1
Note: Refer back to page 3 for a description of epistemic feeling categories
Epistemic
feelings

Questions

Yes/No
Answers

Wonder

a. During the discussion, was the speech attractive?
b. During the discussion, were you impressed by the
voice or the gestures of the lawyers?
c. Did you write the decision at home?
d. Did you write the decision in the office?
e. Did something or someone disturb you during the
discussion of the parties?
f. Did something or someone disturb you when
writing the decision?
g. Did the parties' speech intrigue you?

Ddoubt

a. Was the speech easy to understand?
b. Did you have doubts about the regulatory
framework?
c. Did you have doubts about the facts?
d. Did you consider a premise as obvious?

Rightness

a. Did you consult sources other than the case
documents?
b. Did you consult databases for the decision?
c. Did you consult internet for the decision?
d. Do you think you left out some data or
information?
e. Did you recognize a topic as strong?

Familiarity

a. Did you know the parties?
Did you know the lawyers?
b. Did you know the topic of the case?
c. Have you ever pronounced on this matter?
d. Did the case remind you of something?

If yes:
scale
0: none
1: low
3: moderate
4: high
5: very high

The questions are simplified and are designed to make the participants reflect on emotions and,
above all, on the factors on which emotions depend. For this reason most of the questions concern external situations from which meanings can be inferred.
In an ensuing study, it would be necessary to deepen the answers and ask the judges if
they perceived emotions during the writing of the sentence, if they are able to recognize the emo7

tions and if they perceived one or more epistemic feelings. The judges should therefore describe
the context of emergence of the affective state and qualify it.
Therefore, the questionnaire can also be used as a tool for critical review of one's cognitive process. A deficient or incomplete perception of emotions has repercussions on the ability to
understand social situations and other people's behaviours (see Dellantonio & Pastore on
alesitimic situation). Recognizing emotions is the prerequisite for regulating them and to applying any strategies based on emotions. Each of us has more or less developed emotional regulation abilities: the questionnaire may lead us to understand whether we have used any emotional
information and to maintain control over them.

4. On forensic rhetoric
Researches on epistemic feelings reveal that information is processed not only with reasoning
but also affectively. Our cognitive processes are never purely logical, as information is accompanied by sensations that tell us something (if it is certain, uncertain, evident, doubtful, true,
false). Therefore, the fact that we consider certain information as certain/uncertain, true/false, evident/doubtful, familiar/unfamiliar, may depend not on what we have hard but on our epistemic
feelings.
Such feelings exist, cannot be eliminated and cannot be clearly separated from reasons
because they are part of the reasoning. We believe that such experimental tests concerning epistemic feelings contribute to understanding the 'good reasons of emotions' (Plantin, 2011).
Pathos is not an accessory or an irrational element, but contributes to the construction of
persuasive discourse. Emotions are a complex phenomenon: the arguments, the way of speaking,
and the context in which the argument takes place provoke an emotional reaction, which guides
our deliberation.
The relationship between emotions and judgment should not be understood solely in the
sense that emotions are capable of distorting or influencing speech. When analysing a judgment,
the analysis would include a set of elements, which do not end in the product, but which extend
to the discursive process. Therefore, knowing what kind of person is the one who acts, what relationships he or she has with the parties, what story he or she has are relevant elements for deliberation.
The category of epistemic feelings and their impact on deliberative practice undermines
those models developed by some modern psychological theories of persuasion that maintains a
substantial dualism between rational and irrational processes.
Epistemic feelings show that the processing of a certain cognitive content also depends
on sensitive conditioning.
I am referring in particular to the so-called Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), designed by Petty and Cacioppo (Petty, Cacioppo, 1981, 1986). This model aims to identify which
routes lead us to change our attitudes and, more exactly, what type of cognitive processing is required for this to happen. According to Petty and Cacioppo, this change in attitude can take place
through two differentiated routes, which are mutually exclusive: the central route and the peripheral route. The first is a process of careful elaboration of information and reflection on arguments; the second is based on elements that are not directly relevant to the topic but that are
background information, or peripheral signals, such as the attractiveness of the source, the motivation to give a positive impression of one’s self.
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Starting from this dichotomy, the authors identify two different cognitive routes that are perceived as alternative, in the sense that mutual interferences are not foreseen. This distinction,
prima facie, could recall the Aristotelian classification about rhetorical proofs and, in particular,
the distinction between logos, ethos and pathos. One might think that the central route of the
ELM coincides with the logos, and that ethos and pathos are the peripheral signals. But this is
not the Aristotelian perspective, as it has been correctly revised by Francesca Piazza's studies on
Aristotle (Piazza, 2015).
Ethos and pathos are not in the ‘suburbs’ of cognition and are not an alternative route:
logos ethos and pathos are not alternative or parallel ways of persuasion but interlaced.
Aristotle, also, admits the existence of peripheral elements of persuasion, in the sense
of irrelevant, but does not necessarily identify these elements with the emotional aspects relating
to the speaker or listener. In the rhetorical model, Aristotle conceives of persuasion as a unitary
process in which the emotional state of the speaker and listener fully participates. In the Aristotelian perspective, the speaker and the listener are not external to the discourse, but actors who participate and construct a discursive situation. In other words, persuasive discourse is not only the
message that is produced but is also the result of a process in which the speaker and listener play
a constitutive role.
What is said is one of the elements that make up the speech, but there are other circumstances, such as the emotional state of the speaker to be investigated.
5. Conclusion
The affective states are an aspect that modern theories of legal argumentation do not take into
adequate consideration. The analytical attention is always turned to the discourse as it appears in
the sentence: but this discourse is the result of a more complex process.
If we decide to rely on the decision maker, based on what information do we say he is a
correct person? Let's take into consideration his competence, his reliability, and his honesty: this
is not irrational; it is strategic. We may also just follow our own feeling that when we talk about
judges we refer to someone highly reliable.
Only an authentically rhetorical perspective enhances the emotional dimension of the
judicial discourse.
Any attempt to bring the judicial reasoning back to a mathematical proof is a failure:
judgment is a rhetorical discourse in all respects and rhetoric is the relationship between emotions and judgment.
This study constitutes a first step to sensitize judges, by including them in the experimental activity, to the possibility of elaborating the information affectively. By ‘affectively,’ we
do not only mean pleasure / displeasure but something more complex, as believing that you
know something because you feel that. Feeling plays a fundamental role from an epistemic point
of view.
The analytical apparatus of argumentative theories in the legal field must be integrated on
this profile.
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